Four hundred years ago, an English intellectual developed political ideas different to what we may recognize as familiar.
1. Schmitt and Hobbes
In his celebrated treatise, The Concept of the Political, Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) reduced public life to that of friend or enemy. Enemies are the ‘other.’ If we are threatened by an ‘other,’ Schmitt claimed, we will herd together with political ‘friends.’ In my new book, Beyond Reason, Beyond Doubt, I argue that Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) – who greatly influenced Schmitt – employed a similar division to describe politics and political authority. However, as opposed to the distinction of friend/enemy, Hobbes used the criterion of doubt/faith in his most famous book Leviathan.
2. Doubt and Faith
What is meant when we say that Hobbes saw the question of authorityas one of doubt and faith? One way of understanding this is that Hobbes understood the relationship between government and its citizens as like that between God and the Children of Israel. In the same way as the Hebrews trusted all affairs to God without necessarily understanding His commandments, subjects should obey the sovereign (“God’s lieutenant”) even without understanding his judgement. Specifically regarding a Biblical judgement, but generally applicable to all sovereign decisions, Hobbes states that
when anything therein written is too hard for our examination, we are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words; and not to labour in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural science (L. III, 32).
3. Modern Perspective
To put into perspective how odd that sounds to our contemporary ears, let’s consider the general ethic of politics and critical theory in the modern world. Let’s take the specific example of the free press. The free press is supposed to harrass and constantly question power. Secrets are frowned upon and citizens should comprehend any action they are asked to undertake. This is part of the media’s political role although the press are not tasked with sovereign decision-making.
4. Countering the Sceptics
Hobbes disputes that a non-sovereign entity like the free press has the privilege of endless scepticism without public responsibility. We have laid down our personal rights of self-preservation upon entering society, according to Hobbes. Although everyone on their own, fighting for their own survival, would be aware of the dangers they face and opportunities for personal glory, a public authority senses danger and opportunities on behalf of the collective. A culture of political scepticism is inappropriate because individuals have placed their faith and trust in the sovereign. While they have a right to know of decisions and gain a deeper understanding of what such judgements command them, they have no right to disobey such measures provided they benefit from the peace and civilization sovereignty brings.
Hobbes would have loathed the modern free press – not necessarily because it sows doubt – but because its ethic is doubt itself. As a rule, the media believes that the government should represent the desires and wishes of the populace. A government not fulfilling this task is illegitimate.
Although there were no New York Times or Washington Post in the Jacobin, Caroline, or Cromwellian periods of English history, there were the Christian churches, natural rights theorists, and philosophers influenced by Aristotle, not to mind powerful public figures. These subjected power to standards of law, Christian morality, or freedom. Hobbes reserved scathing criticism for all of them. Perhaps the clearest sign of this is that Hobbes believed the sovereign should wield both the sword of power and the staff of religion. By controlling what people are allowed to believe and practise publicly, the sovereign can in turn mould the public, guiding them to have faith in his judgement.
5. Descriptive View
Another way of looking at Hobbes’s theory of politics is that it’s descriptive. Governments – however ineffectively – do exert maximal efforts to make the public believe in their sovereignty. They construct myths, institute national symbols, guard public buildings, and do their best to steer the national debate. No government can exist without there being faith in their legitimacy. Intuitively, all states understand the basic lesson an English philosopher taught us.
My newly published book Beyond Reason, Beyond Doubt: Sovereign Belief in Hobbes’s Leviathan is a must-read for understanding how politics is linked to belief. Hobbes would have understood the current battle for public opinion in America and elsewhere as a question of religion.
1. Beyond Reason, Beyond Doubt
My latest non-fiction book, titled Beyond Reason, Beyond Doubt: Sovereign Belief in Hobbes’s Leviathan, has just been published. I started researching it about two years ago and was inititally interested in the project because I noticed how much Thomas Hobbes – the controversial 17th century jurist, historian, scientist, philosopher and classicist – discussed questions of religion and faith in his celebrated political work, Leviathan (1651). Although it certainly wasn’t uncommon for political works of the time to be interspersed with religious musings, Hobbes’s modern approach to politics combined with his immersion in questions of faith is noteworthy.
Hobbes split questions of belief into religion – which was public and thus fell under sovereign control – and faith – which were privately and sincerely held (though not necessarily true) convictions. Initially I intended to merely examine how Hobbes approached the division of religion and faith. As the project moved on, however, the focus shifted. Hobbes, it seems, had sought a totality of what may be termed ‘sovereign faith.’
2. Hobbes’s Goal
Although the Catholic Church was his greatest foe, he essentially agreed with the Roman clergy that church and state should be united (although he drew the line at heresy, which is essentially an inquiry into private faith). Hobbes tried to erect a barrier of impregnability around the government. He attacked decentralizing forces who wanted to subjugate the sovereign to reason or Scripture, or who simply wanted to divide power. Avoiding a crisis of authoritarian faith was critical. He allowed a private space for belief but wanted control of the public faith to stave off such a crisis. For him the English Civil War was rooted in controversies of authority, not merely power politics.
3. Hobbes and Us
What lessons does Hobbes have for us in the age of autocrats and (mis-?) information? As an example, let’s take one common factor uniting authoritarian leaders like Trump, Erdogan, and Netanyahu. That is their war on sources of supposedly objective information, the media. Media usually see themselves as authoritative and beyond reproach. As a corollary, dictators like Putin and Dutette are suspect. The war on the press (‘enemy of the people’) by such leaders is a war on one authority – a source which the public believes in – so that the government will have more authority.
4. Final Thoughts
Although the ‘press’ in Hobbes’s day would have been limited to philosophers like himself and religious preachers, we can take it that he would have understood the current war between autocrats and the media as more about belief than democracy or freedom. Trump’s labelling of the liberal media as ‘fake news’ is a dumbed-down tactic of Hobbes protecting sovereign faith. And it as much a religious strategy as a political one.
In 2019 there is a reasonable possibility that Donald Trump will be impeached. There is likely to be evidence that he, at the very least, had knowledge that members of his campaign team (including relatives and in-laws) were meeting with Russian actors. That Trump did not immediately purge his campaign should provide a legal argument that he colluded with Russian operatives. Also, Democrats are likely to control at least one of the houses of Congress. Futthermore, in the probable event of damning evidence, moderate Republicans will likely be forced to act under public pressure and advocate impeachment proceedings.
Nonetheless, impeachment is no ‘gimme.’ Not one US president has been directly impeached successfully. And the fallout from one president, Richard Nixon, forced out indirectly by impeachment procedures, may make uncomfortable reading for those who oppose the ‘America First’ agenda.
About a decade and a half after Nixon’s resignation, two figures from that administration would herald a new dawn in American politics, one that is now bearing fruit (if it is a bitter harvest). These men were Pat Buchanan and Roger Ailes, Nixon’s senior adviser and his so-called ‘Executive Producer for TV,’ respectively.
Ailes’ contribution as the architect of Fox News is an obvious milestone in American public life. Fox has come to not only shape American conservatism, but also bring right-wing politics mainstream. Ailes plotted Fox News in the deep recesses of the Nixon administration as he correctly determined that the Republican party would fail without an energetic media platform (American TV in the 1970s was absolutely in the hands of liberal interests or functioned in a way conducive to those interests).
Buchanan, on the other hand, was a less successful architect in his own cause but he would design a political platform which would be significant in shaping American politics. Buchanan responded to both rising immigration from non-European countries and the emergence of a ‘new world order’ by which America effectively integrated with the rest of the world (downplaying its particularism and exceptionalism) by going rogue. At the turn of the last century he argued that America should only agree to deals confirming American superiority, he called for a Southern border wall and an end to mass migration, he advocated economic nationalism, a withdrawal of the US from the Middle East, and accused the media of waging a culture war. He enjoyed moderate success in Republican circles but failed to convert his radical politics into nationwide electoral success. Many at the time criticized him for being too out-there, including one Donald Trump.
By 2015, Trump took the rejected stone he (and most of America) once scorned and built his entire campaign in Buchanan’s nationalist image. By this time, Roger Ailes had helped transform the political landscape. It was ok to be against immigrants, you could argue for police brutality, you could reject civil discourse, and trumpet America’s superiority chauvanistically.
The moral of the story is that two of Nixon’s allies were able to build a powerful political movement on the ashes of an impeached and disgraced presidency. If what seems inevitable does happen, and Trump is forced to resign – say around 2022 – that will not be the end of the matter. There are the Bannons, the Millers, the Sanders, the Conways, and maybe even figures outside the limelight, who will carry the ‘America First’ torch forward. They have insider knowledge, they know the cracks in the system, the tactical advantages, and the areas of expansion. They have connections, are recognized opinion leaders, and have value as political operatives. So, the impeachment of Trump might just kick the can of American triumphalism down the road. The ghost of an impeached president may rise up again.
Thought-crime is a phrase bandied about as much nowadays as ‘witch-hunt’ or ‘Benghazi.’ Its a pejorative term used on both the right and left to protest limits on speech and actions. People who utilize the phrase claim that legitimate expression has been criminalized in a certain situation. A recent celebrated example involved far-right activist Tommy Robinson (b. Stephen Yaxley-Lennon) who broke a court order. Supporters across the world (although only a relative few in the UK) demanded his release, with the narrative largely about the state criminalizing expression. We could name numerous other instances across the political spectrum where the cry of thought-crime has rang out. This particular issue has become contentious.
2. Origins and Critique
First mentioned in Orwell’s 1984, thought-crime examplifies the abuse of state power. Critics say that not only is the state determined to control public infrastructure, education, taxes, and what drugs we take … it also wants total control over what we see, hear and even think.
The critique of thought crime is justified on the basis that governments must serve the people, must listen to them, allow them to change society as they see fit, and facilitate them when they assume radical standpoints. Thought-crime is also portrayed as ‘using a hammer to crack a nut,’ i.e. overbearing force brought to bear on a scenario.
3. The Main Flaws
Despite the hyperbole, the fact is that thought-crime is misused as a term far more than it is used correctly. This misunderstanding arises for two maim reasons. First of all, critics wrongly assert that governments have no right to limit expression. The second issue, bound up with the first, is that any limiting of expression amounts to thought-crime. Added to these two main reasons is the fact that critics never pay attention to the structure of the phrase thought-crime; it is penalizing inner volitions and attitudes, not external ones. A by-product of such a lack of understanding is that real thought-crime gets missed. I will now elaborate a bit more but also concede that governments do engage in thought-crime.
4. Rights of Censorship
Government has a right to censor what we see or hear and even the most liberal countries do so (although they are hesitant to say so). The best way to explicate this is consideration of some examples. Sailors on navy ships can’t justify their call for a mutiny on free speech grounds. Expressions of racism are banned in many countries. Someone can’t call for a neighbour’s house to be burnt down on free speech grounds. Even conspiracy theorists like Alex Jones have been sued for making false allegations. And, in the celebrated recent case already mentioned, a judge can impose restrictions on what is expressed publicly so a court case can proceed smoothly.
The basic rule is that speech is restricted where it conflicts with other rights and protections individuals have, or where it hampers the procedures of government or justice.
From these examples you can see how bogus the claims of those who cry ‘thought-crime’ are. Reasonable limits can be placed on our activities. Speech and expression can be curtailed so long as such statutes and measures satisfy certain qualities of law, such as equity and public proclamation.
5. Real Thought-crime
At the same time, governments do engage in thought-crime. I would define it roughly along these lines; a person may behave in accordance with the law but is yet accused and even prosecuted for breaking the law on other counts. This has happened regularly in recent times with terror laws, which have been used to silence forms of legitimate, if controversial, activism, such as environmental campaigning. It occurred in the past in places like South Africa where anti-communist laws were used to jail civil rights protestors. Actions such as banning face-veils in public are also examples of thought-crime. No link can be established between acts of terror and dress specific to Muslims (acts of terror are often committed by non-practising Muslims) but national security concerns are invoked to ground such measures.
More generally, thought-crime is where suspicion of an individuals private motives and volitions is the primary basis for introducing sets of different laws or justifying measures which restrict the lawful activities of such persons. It has nothing to do with existing laws which don’t specifically target individuals or groups unfairly but which limit expression. To invoke thought-crime frequently is to devalue the term and allow actual thought-crime to occur.
Governments represent the interests of society in general. As such, they do have a right to ban or curtail certain forms of expression. Nonetheless, they must give reasons for such actions. If they claim that certain forms of expression pose threats to the operation of public duties and individual liberties they must demonstrate the link.
Accotding to his peeps (and himself of course), Donald Trump is a great civil rights leader. Over America’s memorial day weekend he tweeted that US serviceman had died for low minority unemployment figures! And last week, his one-time election strategist Steve Bannon (no longer employed by Trump) pushed the same argument; black and minority jobless figures are low, therefore Donald Trump is not as racist as he sounds and is actually a racial progressive. He is a force for integration via enterprise.
Without getting into various incidents involving, and statements by, Trump which would easily lay bare his position on race let’s get to the heart of the argument. Jobless figures during a period of economic growth do not tell us the state of race relations in any country. Even in the bleakest days of apartheid South Africa, a rising tide lifted all boats and there was virtually zero unemployment among blacks at irregular periods (albeit their remuneration was pittance compared to their white counterparts). And do we have to bring up the well-worn jibe about blacks being fully employed in the antebellum South? Unemployment figures aren’t completely useless either in telling us the state of racial play but analysis needs to be over the long-term and especially observant of what happens when the tide is lowered.
Since a growing economy masks racial division we must turn to other indicators of racial integration. For example, there is evidence that race still is a major source of political division in the US. It’s fair to say that the US is a more racist country now than 30 years ago, most likely due to the surge of conservative media. Police brutality is impossible to hide and incarceration rates remain disproportionately high for blacks. Is Trump pushing back against this culture? No. He targets black athletes for protesting and built his campaign on anti-Latino sentiment. Added to that are statements by the supposedly racially blind President about his preferences for immigrants from Norway as opposed to non-Caucasian countries.
So, the US jobless rate for minorities has fallen over the last decade. On the other hand, institutional racism – while nowhere near Jim Crow levels – has been fortified. Furthermore, ‘unofficial’ racism – the ease with which opinion leaders feel free to promote negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities – has gone through the roof.
Granted, Americas racial problems are complex and one man isn’t going to solve them. Yet any fair-minded person has to draw the conclusion that Trump is contributing to a culture where, when the tap starts to run drier, African-Americans will likely find themselves economically as well as socially disadvantaged. In summary, Trump is the most racist President since Woodrow Wilson; and all the sweat in the world can’t hide that.
Currently, I’m researching Thomas Hobbes’s (1588-1679) Leviathan (1651)for a book I’m writing. I noticed that Hobbes’s theory of war in one chapter of Leviathan (Book I, 13) resembles that of one of his closest followers, Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), the controversial German jurist. Schmitt discussed war in numerous places. But the theory of war most similar to Hobbes is contained in his classic essay The Concept of the Political (1927).
What united both authors was the conviction that war really wasn’t about military conflict as such. It was more a state of mind, of which war offered a ‘limiting case.’ This common view supported their broader philosophical outlooks, both of which were divergent.
2. Hobbes and Civil War
Hobbes’s main concern is justifying peace and order. To achieve this he contrasts a state of anarchy to one of peace. In the state of nature all men pursue their separate interests and run the risk of clashing with one another. Although Hobbes does discuss the right of sovereigns to make foreign war in numerous passages of Leviathan (e.g. kings are in a “posture of war” with one another (L, I, 13)), global conflicts are an afterthought to which Hobbes offers little insight. By far, Hobbes’s leading concern is with the possibility of civil war, the language of which is nihilistic. Warfare is part and parcel of a pre-political condition which occurs when there is no common guardian standing over men and is synonymous with civil war. But the thrust of Hobbes’s polemic with respect to the state of nature is directed against liberty which he says runs counter to law. War is merely another phenomenon which occurs when men are free.
3. Schmitt and the Political
For Schmitt, war is a ‘given’ whenever there are political units who distinguish each other according to his celebrated friend/enemy criterion. As opposed to many other political thinkers who portray politics as servicing a common good, Schmitt’s concept of politics is inherently sectarian; war thus appears as a natural element of politics.
Unlike Hobbes, Schmitt never contemplates the idea that there could ever be a state of total anarchy. Even civil war involves well-identified groups (CP, 32). He always sees organization as emerging with respect to war, and this is also true with respect to groups who are outwardly ‘anti-war.’
If pacifist hostility toward war were so strong as to drive pacifists into a war against nonpacifists, in a war against war, that would prove that pacifism truly possesses political energy because it is sufficiently strong to group men according to friend and enemy (CP, 36).
4. Comparative Similarity
While Schmitt doesn’t construct a fictional state of nature, he agrees with Hobbes that the looming threat of war motivates man’s behaviour in critical ways. Let’s compare passages from both Hobbes and Schmitt.
For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known (L, I, 13).
War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But as an ever present possibility it is the leading presupposition which determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behavior (CP, 34).
These examples reveal the key similarity. For Hobbes and Schmitt, war is not the fact of actual fighting but an aggressive suspiciousness and preparedness for conflict. People are battle-ready, even if not at war. Military conflict doesn’t have independent meaning although it forms a critical element in their outlooks. Hobbesian or Schmittian philosophy sans guerre would be incomprehensible but it would be wrong to see them as reducing politics to militarism. War is the most important consideration for men or political entities but it is subordinate to either (a) the will of man to live at liberty, for Hobbes, or (b) the natural tendency of groups, for Schmitt, to live within the political domain.
5. Radical Differences
War is vital to both theories as a perspective but in radically different ways. War for Hobbes is a ‘floor’ to which men can sink in the absence of fear with respect to a common power. Even those who know little of Hobbes have probably read the following lament concerning war in a news article.
In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (L, I, 13).
War is merely destruction and uncertainty for Hobbes. His theory recognizes war but is concerned with removing its spectre. By contrast, war for Schmitt is the climax of human existence.
There always are concrete human groupings which fight other concrete human groupings … The high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy (CP, 67).
Whereas Hobbes consistently views war as offering a window into man’s psychological deficiencies, Schmitt shows little interest in exploring this aspect. War is an ongoing political reality and is accepted as a given. Men are inherently political; war comes with political territory and is reduced to a means. Schmitt has no interest in abolishing war, forms a realistic view of its existence, and at times glorifies it. Hobbes generally conceptualizes war as a nihilistic condition and he condemns it.
It is perhaps not surprising that Schmitt shows a Hobbesian influence in his assessment of war. His theory of authoritarianism, for example, is largely Hobbesian. Yet Schmitt’s concept of politics is radically dissimilar to Hobbes but the two men yet find common ground in using and conceptualizing war in near identical ways within their variant philosophies.
I am working on a book about the religious beliefs of Thomas Hobbes as expressed in his masterpiece Leviathan. The following is a short biography of Hobbes, along with some information on Leviathan.
Thomas Hobbes was born in Malmesbury in 1588, the year of the Spanish Armada. He was the son of a minor clergyman who acquired a reputation for alcoholism and aggressive behaviour. Despite his tumultuous family environment Hobbes’s uncle, Francis, saw the academic potential in Thomas. In 1603, Uncle Francis paid for his nephew to be educated at Magdalen College, Oxford. In later years, Hobbes registered negative memories concerning the decadence of university life and the pernicious influence (as he saw it) of Aristotle and the general tenor of late Scholasticism, complaints which may have been exaggerated although not wholly unfounded.
Graduating in 1608, Hobbes went to work for William Cavendish (1552–1626), aka Baron Cavendish of Hardwick, to tutor his eldest son (1590–1628) of the same name. Both Hobbes and the younger Cavendish were close in age, with the choice of Hobbes by the elder Williamdeliberately designed to kill two birds with one stone, i.e. to simultaneously educate young William and provide companionship for the boy. The appointment of the freshly graduated tutor sparked a life–long association between Hobbes and the Cavendishes. Hobbes went on the Grand Tour with the family, shared in business ventures, and had his later academic pursuits bankrolled by the the Cavendishes.
Hobbes moved in scholarly circles both in England and on the Continent, encountering the great minds of the age. He met the Venetian ‘reason of state’ philosopher Paolo Sarpi (1552–1623), discussed natural philosophy with great scientists like Galileo (1564–1642), and did secretarial work for arguably the outstanding British mind of the age, Francis Bacon (1561–1626). Despite his exposure to the cutting edge natural philosophy of the time, Hobbes would refuse to completely join in with the spirit of experimental science if it conflicted with his broader metaphysical and religious outlook. This tendency would see him all but excluded from the Royal Society in his later years. However, he did produce an atomic theory which seems to have been arrived at independently of both Descartes (1596–1650) and Galileo. His first major work was a translation of the works of the ancient historian Thucydides (ca. 460–400 B.C.) from the original Greek, a book published in 1629. Hobbes was dismissed from employment with the Cavendishes around this time following the death of the younger William. He went to work for a friend of another Cavendish, renewing his employment with the late William’s widow, the Countess of Devonshire, in 1631.
Hobbes developed his scientific, philosophical, religious, legal, and political ideas during the 1630s. In 1640 and 1642, respectively, he published the first editions of The Elements of Law and De Cive (On the Citizen), works which were precursors to his political masterpiece, Leviathan, which was first published in English in 1651. His preoccupation with politics was related to the concrete situation in England where the reign of King Charles I (1600–1649) generated resistance and then civil war. For his part, Hobbes was a Royalist although the circumstances which eventually brought Cromwell (1599–1658) to act as the last English dictator would later cause him to modify his support for monarchy. Such was his immersion in politics at this time that Hobbes even stood unsuccessfully as a parliamentary candidate for Derby in 1640.
Civil war forced Hobbes to stay on the Continent for much of the conflict and interregnum, a full eleven years from 1640 to 1651. Fittingly, he witnessed the beginning of the reign of the young Louis XIV (1638–1715), an absolute monarch whose long rule could be seen as a metaphor for Hobbesian autocracy. Hobbes tutored the future Charles II (1630–1685) while in Paris. He also found more support for his ideas amongst European philosophers than British ones, and this was a trend that would continue both in his lifetime and for centuries afterwards. Nonetheless, certain critics like Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) recognized that the genius of Hobbes was coupled with an more than an element of autocracy, a brutal anthropology and unorthodoxy. Long before Leviathan was published, Grotius said in a letter to his brother regarding De Cive that
I like what he says in favour of kings, but I cannot approve the foundation on which he builds his opinions. He thinks that all men are naturally at war with one another, and has some other principles which differ from my own. For example, he thinks it is the duty of each private individual to follow the official religion of his country – if not with internal assent, then at least with outward observance.
Despite general admiration for his ideas in Europe, attacks on the Catholic Church in Leviathan in the religiously charged atmosphere of the time meant Hobbes had to leave the Continent in 1651 and return to England. Back in his native land, it was not the excessive criticism of Rome which would land him in trouble but the atheism and heresy he seemed to promote. There were even charges of secretly spreading Islamic ideas. Yet, in his writings and in his personal life, Hobbes avoided neat categorization as either a Protestant or Catholic. That is not to say either that his beliefs were fluid or constantly shifting and the best appraisal of Hobbes is that he was a devout, if independently minded, theist. He subscribed to a scholarly interpretation of Christianity based on Scripture, justification by faith, as well as Divine election, all staples of 17th century Protestantism. What distinguished him from other Protestants was the radically different political perspective Hobbes drew from such beliefs, the culmination of which meant investing the sovereign with total power while, at the same time, never deprecating the freedom of the Christian believer to pursue his own faith. It was the more controversial aspects of his philosophy that come to the fore, however, and for most of the last quarter century of his life, Hobbes lived under a cloud of suspicion, with his books burnt by opponents, mild forms of censorship being imposed at times, and the threat of death for heresy a real, if perhaps not a near–certain, possibility. A long–running intellectual struggle with John Bramhall, Bishop of Derry (1594–1663), over Hobbes’s espousal of predestination was a particularly intense feud.
The hostility directed towards Hobbes meant that events like the Fire of London were even laid at his door by some opponents. Hobbes excited hatred and individuals accused of ‘Hobbism’ could suffer institutional humiliation in the form of having to recant their Hobbist views. Generally, the defenders of clerical independence were his greatest enemies while Hobbes’s espousal of absolute sovereignty provided useful material to those in power. By the time of his death in 1679, he had a reputation as an intelligent but dangerously immoral thinker and his apologists were on the back foot in the face of powerful and well–connected critics. He suffered the same lampooning in popular culture by the end of the 17th century as Machiavelli (1469–1527) had a century before. A modern author, Parkin, summarized Hobbes’s journey from inoffensively respectable scholar to reviled outcast in the following terms:
In 1640 Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, the 52-year-old secretary to the Earl of Devonshire, had a minor reputation as a respected translator and pastoral poet. To a small number of his friends he was also known as a promising mathematician and natural philosopher, perhaps even England’s answer to Descartes. By 1700 all of this had changed. Hobbes had an international reputation, but not as an acclaimed scientist. Indeed, that reputation lay largely in ruins. He was widely known as the most notorious philosopher that England had ever produced. His name had become a byword for atheism, immorality and a whole range of unacceptable political views. To his English readers, he was the ‘Monster of Malmesbury’, the ‘Devil’s Secretary’, an ‘Agent of Hell’ and as one writer put it ‘Nature’s Pest’ and ‘unhappy England’s Shame’ … By the end of the century Hobbes had managed to acquire an extraordinary and perhaps even unique place in the English imagination as the bête noire of his age.
As for Leviathan itself, it’s unclear when exactly Hobbes began work on his masterpiece, but it’s safe to say 1649 was the latest date. At this stage, Hobbes had moved from becoming a respected academic to a famous writer, a perception largely because of his 1647 edition of De Cive, a version which defined the philosophy of Hobbes on the continent for several centuries hence. Leviathan completed his political writings which started with Elements. A large part of his project was to refute Cardinal Bellarmine’s (1542–1621) Disputationes de Controversiis Christianae Fidei Adversus Hujus Temporis Haereticos (Disputations Concerning the Controversies of the Christian Faith Against the Heretics of this Time). A revised Latin edition was published in 1668. Most of the revisions and clarifications related to aspects of religious doctrine. While his earlier political works were unashamedly royalist,Leviathan adopted a more ambiguous tone towards other forms of government, a policy motivated by a mixture of concerns for his own personal safety, a desire to see an end to conflict in England, and an acknowledgement of the reality that the days of absolute monarchy in England were numbered. A measure of his slightly modified royalism is that the future King Charles refused to grant an audience to Hobbes shortly after Leviathan’s publication. What disturbed many royalist readers of Leviathan, such as Robert Filmer (1588–1653), was that the foundation of Hobbes’s political theory was decidedly democratic – resting as it did on a social contract – and this seemed to justify rebellion against the king. At the same time, Hobbes felt compelled to square his new turn with his previous opinions. Leviathan still gave the sovereign – be it a monarch or popular assembly – control over religion and he still portrayed authority in personal terms, something conducive to monarchy more than other government forms. Leviathan focused more on promoting heterodox religious positions, such as denying the incorporeality of the soul, relative to previous works and he also attacked the Catholic church with added gusto in the book. Hobbes showed himself particularly astute at both justifying total power while at the same time arguing that Christians sacrifice none of their fundamental beliefs in being pliant subjects. In other parts of Leviathan, Hobbes seemed to condone statue–worship and he made significant contributions to theories of representative government. Upon the release of Leviathan, enemies were stirred to action and there were petitions as early as 1652 to parliament to ban Hobbes’s maguum opus. Amongst Presbyterian book–sellers Leviathan was effectively banned. For many critics of Hobbes, the book would be their first serious proof that they were dealing with a truly rebellious intellectual. Apart from justifying arbitrary sovereignty and a diminution of clerical authority, Leviathan seemed to critics like Bramhall to be a ‘rebel’s catechism’ because monarchy had no Divine basis. Like the author himself, Leviathan stirred a vast panoply of mostly negative commentary but a not insignificant number of admirers. Curiously, even those who refuted this classic of early modern literature couldn’t help but be influenced to a degree by its systematic and logical–deductive arguments.
 Bunce. Thomas Hobbes; 1–2; Malcolm. Reason of state; 1–2.
 Malcolm. Reason of state; 3–8, 14–15.  Biletzki. Talking wolves; 5–7; Bunce. Thomas Hobbes; 2–7, 12–13; Malcolm. Reason of state; 8–15; Parkin. Taming the Leviathan; 215–222; Shapin & Schaffer. Leviathan and the air-pump.
 Bunce. Thomas Hobbes; 8–9; Parkin. Taming the Leviathan; 18–32; Tuck. The Utopianism of Leviathan. In Leviathan after 350 years; 126–127.
 Parkin. Taming the Leviathan; 34–35.
 Bunce. Thomas Hobbes; 9–14, 68–83; Hobbes et al. Hobbes and Bramhall on liberty and necessity; Lessay. Hobbes’s Protestantism. In Leviathan after 350 years; 265–294; Martinich. The two gods of Leviathan; 1–7; Parkin. Taming the Leviathan; 1–11, 35–71, 112–357; Thornton. State of nature or Eden?; 6–11; Wright. Religion, politics and Thomas Hobbes; 251–259.
 Parkin. Taming the Leviathan; 1.
 Glover. God and Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes et al. Hobbes: “On the Citizen”; xxxiii; Lessay. Hobbes’s Protestantism. In Leviathan after 350 years; 270–287; Malcolm. Leviathan, the Pentateuch, and the Origins of Modern Biblical Criticism. In Leviathan after 350 years; 15–30; 256–260; Parkin. Taming the Leviathan; 85–193; Schumann. Leviathan and De Cive. In Leviathan after 350 years; 15–30.
Biletzki, A., & Biletzki, A. (1997). Talking wolves: Thomas Hobbes on the language of politics and the politics of language. Dordrecht: Springer.
Bunce, R. E. (2009). Thomas Hobbes (Major Conservative and Libertarian Thinkers). Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd.
Foisneau, L., & Sorell, T. (2005). Leviathan after 350 years. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Glover, W. B. (1960). God and Thomas Hobbes. Church History, 29(03), 275.
Hobbes, T., Bramhall, J., & Chappell, V. C. (2003). Hobbes and Bramhall on liberty and necessity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hobbes, T., Tuck, R., Silverthorne, M., Geuss, R., & Skinner, Q. (1998). Hobbes: “On the Citizen”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Malcolm, N. (2010). Reason of state, propaganda, and the Thirty Years War: an unknown translation by Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
Martinich, A. (2002). The two gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on religion and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parkin, J. (2010). Taming the Leviathan: the reception of the political and religious ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England 1640-1700. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Shapin, S., & Schaffer, S. (2018). Leviathan and the air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the experimental life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Thornton, H. (2005). State of nature or Eden?: Thomas Hobbes and his contemporaries on the natural condition of human beings. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
Wright, G. H. (2006). Religion, politics and Thomas Hobbes. Dordrecht: Springer.
The internet age is a non-fiction writers’ paradise. 20 years ago, we might have needed to go to the local library, the local university, and even a major book repository like the British library, to do research. Nowadays, much of our material can be accessed on our smartphone if we have a solid wi-fi connection. But although we can gain easier access to sources, the art of writing non-fiction itself has changed little. Here are the best ways to maximize your non-fiction writing experience.
Plan, plan, and plan again. You are going to spend a lot of time looking for sources and reading material. Not to mind writing the blasted thing! Zeroing in on what you are going to write saves time and focuses your attention. Spend at least a month planning and try to condense your plan into an easy to understand paragraph so that you know your idea is strong.
Do you have enough material? An obvious one, but imagine you have this great plan but no way to execute? A quick online search will tell you if you’re chasing a fool’s errand although if you are conducting primary research you may need to contact universities or institutes.
Do you have too much matetial? A notso obvious one. We are so used to seeing our generic experts and authorities effortlessly discourse on their new publication, we think they must have read everything. They may even unconsciously say things like “I have looked at all the facts.” What they mean to say is that they have looked at all the facts relevant to their subject, and that means they have tightly defined what they need and unlikely to use more than that.
A theme is a trunk. Remember I said you need a strong idea? By this I mean that you need a powerful theme. The theme is the trunk of your book tree. The evidence, theories, arguments, etc … are the branches, or even the roots as they support your theme. You need a strong theme because that carries the weight of your book.
Editing: No pain, no gain. What you’ve written is so good, you made such a good point, and its so imaginatively framed. But does it support the trunk? Or is it going deeper than you need to go? If it doesn’t do the first, cut it; if it does the second, relegate it to a footnote. I know it’s painful but …
Less is more. We all have fond memories of a 600 page history book we had when we were young, with old black & white photos (or at least if you went on to write non-fiction, you did). So we want to get up to at least 400 pages with our manuscript. Don’t think like this. A 100 page book that’s tightly argued is better than a loose 400 page book. Sometimes we need 400 pages but the fact is that many large books are boring in parts and lose their readers, although they may still be of good quality. But you don’t want a reader to say “I liked this, but not that.” You want them to be consistently intrigued.
Short chapters or sections. Chapters, or even sections, help readers digest what they are reading. If you need long chapters, then have lots of short sections. It even helps the writer to focus.
Quotes. While doing your research, you come across a quote that absolutely nails it. You come across 50 more that absolutely nail it. However, resist temptation. This is your book. It’s about what you think based on what you’ve studied. As a default, try not to use quotes unless necessary.
Formatting quotes. Following on from the last point, as a default never use block quotes. Instead of a separate paragraph with one quote, try to cite it in the paragraph with ” ” around it. Use block quotes where the quote is long, flows seamlessly from your paragraph, and is not difficult to decipher (unless you are making the point that someone was a cryptic writer).
Tell your story. Most importantly, remember you’re a storyteller. You are no different to a fiction author in that regard. Read your book out loud and change tack if its not interesting. People buy books to hear a voice and proof of that is the growth in audiobooks. Perhaps even picture yourself in front of a fire!
I have just published my 5th non-fiction book and hope this advice was of use.
The idea in the book is that politics can be understood as a dialectic of what I call the unquestioned and questions.
By unquestioned we can think of the sacred in religion, or the reverence shown to a person in a monarchy or principles such as the rule of law or popularity in a republic.When this authority is largely unquestioned, we say it enjoys legitimacy.
Invariably any unquestioned source of power benefits some people and discriminates against others. Those others then ask questions of established power. These others are arranged into groups but frame their objections to power in moral terms. As is said in the book “Politics is social manoeuvring disguised as ethics.”
To avoid revolution, those in authority must rationalize their power and fortify themselves. While this avoids revolution it also means that their grip on public affairs is weakened. The process is continually repeated. There is controversy and crisis, there are responses to controversy and crisis, disaster is averted, the cycle starts again. At some stage the balancing act between maintaining power and pretending that power doesn’t exist, that it’s just natural, reaches a fatal point and there is usurpation, overthrow, and revolution.
Western and Islamic philosophers, both of whom are steeped in the Greek tradition, have generally explored the idea that politics, controversies, and crises, can be ended. They have believed in the unquestioned. The general ideological, intellectual, sociological, and historical trends of the last several centuries can all be categorized in a box marked: The end of controversy and crisis.
A famous exposition was given bythe celebrated neo–conservative philosopher Francis Fukuyama (b. 1952) who captured a prevailing mood in his book The End of History And the Last Man (1992). He admitted to the imperfections of liberal democracy, but was convinced that it yet was the best way to balance competing and conflicting principles such as liberty and equality. .
Not surprisingly, endimg history has been accompanied by a desire to end all forms of domination by humans over other humans (i.e. an ending of authority). The words ‘crisis’ and ‘controversy’ may still be used, but they will inaccurately depict situations that will more precisely be.described as events that are slight wrinkles on the fabric of the ‘new’ history.
The three intellectuals who form the focus of my new publication rebelled against this tradition. Ibn Khaldun, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Carl Schmitt were realists. They did not seek to make controversy and crisis history. They appreciated that authority would want to make itself unquestioned but they were also aware that such policies were ultimately fatal.
For Ibn Khaldun, imprudent taxation was the fatal mistake, for Machiavelli, it was allowing corruption to set into a political system, and for Schmitt the death-blow was when the sovereign refused to take vital decisions.
As an example, let’s look at Ibn Khaldun. He applied a five step model of dynastic power with the concept of ‘asabiyyah – loosely translated as group–feeling or group–ethic – at its heart.
Step 1: Once a dynasty loses ‘asabiyyah, it is overtaken by a rival with greater ‘asabiyyah.
Step 2: The insurgents are foreign and thus their usurpation is controversial. To rationalize their power and make the dynasty unquestioned the incumbents first consolidate their rule. This is accomplished largely through just dealings and light burdens being placed on the populace.
Step 3: Then, the dynasty purges itself of its former supporters and finds new clients who will support it. This is to avoid crises stemming from internal power struggles.
Step 4: Later, the demands of the court outstrip those of fair and equitable dealings. More laws, taxes, and intrusions are needed to de–personalize power but are also products of an inner corruption and decadence.
Step 5: Finally, the dynasty is ripe for overthrow and can no longer call on the same store of zeal as its competitor who overthrows it.
For Ibn Khaldun, but also in different ways for Machiavelli and Schmitt, its not the end of history, but the end of a world. They asked disturbing and important questions about politics, questions that are especially relevant today because we are aware that history has not ended.
Its been a long, hard slog but finally I have put my 5th book out there into the publishing ether. My new work – entitled “Controversy and Crisis: The Question Concerning the Unquestioned in Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, and Carl Schmitt” has seen the light of Kindle. I focus on three of the greatest philosophers in human history and set them in opposition to the broad swathe of Muslim, Christian, and other intellectuals who have sought to ‘end history’ through politics. In the book, I argue that Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, and Carl Schmitt, adopted a realistic approach to politics which yet was formal and did not deprecate civilized life. They were anarchists, but not nihilists. The book consistently explores themes of judgement, authority, revolution, establishment, and uncertainty to produce a compelling narrative. And its great value to buy as well!